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Abstract 
This Working Paper investigates whether the Early Warning Mechanism (EWM), in which national 
parliaments check the legislative proposals of the European Union (EU) for their subsidiarity 
compliance, is essentially a legal or a political procedure. This is closely related to the longstanding 
debate over whether the principle of subsidiarity itself is a legal or a political concept. Unpacking this 
debate reveals three distinct questions. First, should subsidiarity and the EWM be studied by legal 
scholars or political scientists? Second, should subsidiarity and the EWM be implemented by legal or 
political institutions? And third, do subsidiarity and the EWM entail a legal or a political mode of 
reasoning? A thoroughgoing theoretical and historical analysis shows that there is persistent 
disagreement among academic observers and political practitioners alike concerning the legal or 
political nature of the EWM. Building upon this analysis, it is possible to construct a typology of three 
approaches to subsidiarity and the EWM: Legal Rule-Following, Political Bargaining, and Policy 
Arguing. 
Keywords 
Early Warning Mechanism; European Union; national parliaments; subsidiarity. 
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I. Introduction: Legal or Political? A Highly Instructive Question 
Is the Early Warning Mechanism (EWM), in which national parliaments check the legislative 
proposals of the European Union (EU) for their subsidiarity compliance, essentially a legal or a 
political procedure? This is a difficult question that reasonable people, both academic observers and 
political practitioners, disagree over how to answer. The nature and purpose of the EWM has always 
been ambiguous and contested: this was true when it was originally conceived in the European 
Convention (2002-2003) and when it was codified in the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), and it has continued 
to be so as the EWM has been worked out in practice. The role of national parliaments in the EWM 
has been likened on one hand to a Council of State, conducting an advisory “legal review” of EU 
legislation,
1
 and on the other to a “virtual third chamber,” a political body with the power to intervene 
in the EU’s legislative process.2 Even after the EWM has been in operation for five years, it is not 
obvious which description is closer to the truth. 
This question is also, as it turns out, highly instructive: the simple legal-versus-political dichotomy 
covers a number of inter-related debates, and an analysis of these gives us a more nuanced overview of 
the competing interpretations of the EWM. This question is inextricably linked to the deeper, 
normative question of whether the principle of subsidiarity, around which the EWM revolves, is 
fundamentally a legal or political concept. Most of this chapter is devoted to “unpacking” this debate, 
which reveals three distinct questions. First (Section II), should subsidiarity and the EWM be studied 
by legal scholars or political scientists? A review of the literature shows that these disciplines 
approach the subject in different, but complementary ways. A second question (Section III) is, should 
subsidiarity and the EWM be implemented by legal or political institutions? A historical review shows 
that the implementation of the principle of subsidiarity in the EU has always been primarily the 
responsibility of political institutions. The EWM is an innovation only in that it brings in a new bunch 
of political institutions, national parliaments, as subsidiarity watchdogs. The European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) has the authority to interpret the relevant subsidiarity provisions of the EU treaties, but it has 
never substantially exercised it. The third question (Section IV) is, do subsidiarity and the EWM entail 
a legal or a political mode of reasoning? The answer depends on one’s understanding of the principle 
of subsidiarity, both in itself and as it relates to adjacent treaty principles (proportionality, conferral) 
and, at a further remove, political concerns (policy effectiveness, political expediency).  
Building upon this analysis, a typology (Section V) is presented in which there are not just two but 
three broad approaches to the EWM – one “legal” and two “political.” These are ideal types (although 
exemplified by certain participants, in parentheses below), and each depends on a different 
understanding of subsidiarity. The first approach is Legal Rule-Following (Commission, Finnish 
Eduskunta), in which subsidiarity is a quasi-legal rule whose requirements may be clearly ascertained. 
National parliaments defer to the Commission’s interpretation of subsidiarity, based on a system of 
rigorous impact assessment. If national parliaments have other concerns about a proposal (e.g. 
proportionality, policy substance), they raise them in the Political Dialogue rather than the EWM. The 
second approach is Political Bargaining (Danish Folketing, Dutch Tweede Kamer), in which 
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subsidiarity is an endlessly flexible concept which may be interpreted so as to allow or prohibit almost 
any course of EU action. National parliaments use the EWM when they see it is in their political 
interest to oppose an EU measure. They will seek to build a coalition to achieve a yellow or orange 
card. The third approach is Policy Arguing (Swedish Riksdag, UK House of Commons), in which 
subsidiarity is a vague but nevertheless useful concept. The EWM enables a policy argument between 
the Commission and national parliaments concerning whether and how the EU should legislate in 
particular circumstances. To be clear, the point is of this section is to sketch out the three approaches, 
using certain parliaments as illustrative examples,
3
 not to comprehensively categorize all the national 
parliaments; furthermore, throughout the paper I refer to some EU legislative proposals to illustrate 
my points – in particular the two proposals that were the targets of the first two yellow cards – but no 
attempt is made to provide a comprehensive legislative history of the EWM. Finally, the chapter 
concludes (Section VI) by pointing out that the EWM remains a contested procedure in that the 
participants cannot agree on the social rules governing it. However, the Commission has recently 
signalled that it may be open to a more explicitly political EWM in the future.  
II. Are Subsidiarity and the EWM Best Studied by Legal Scholars or Political 
Scientists? 
First of all, should subsidiarity and the EWM be studied by political scientists or legal scholars? This 
is, in context, a foolish question, given that the growing body of literature on this subject – including, 
of course, the many exemplary works within this volume – features scholars from both disciplines. It 
would be a mistake to assume that legal scholars would automatically adhere to a narrow, legalistic 
approach to the EWM, and that political scientists would favour a broader, more explicitly political, 
approach. In fact, the existing scholarship on the EWM does not fit this pattern, as a “narrow-vs.-
broad” debate may be discerned within both disciplines. For example, the authors of one legal 
commentary on the first use of the “yellow card” – in the case of the “Monti II” Regulation on the 
right to strike – argued that the national parliaments went beyond their role by raising objections that 
were not strictly based on subsidiarity concerns; they argued that the proposal was clearly compliant 
with subsidiarity, implying in effect that the yellow card was a misuse of the EWM.
4
 Other legal 
theorists, however, have written approvingly of the “political approach”5 that was evident in the case 
of the first yellow card and of national parliaments’ “creative” use of the subsidiarity framework.6 
Political scientists, too, differ in whether they envisage the subsidiarity review under the EWM in 
broad or narrow terms. From one perspective that adopts a flexible understanding of subsidiarity, the 
EWM could lessen the democratic deficit by giving national parliaments greater influence at the EU 
level, so that they become a “virtual third chamber” for the EU.7 Against this view, others have argued 
that the EWM will not reduce the democratic deficit, in part because violations of subsidiarity are rare 
occurrences, and that national parliaments would be well advised to focus their attention elsewhere in 
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 Empirically, I drew liberally from the trove of useful information, both country-specific and comparative, to be found in 
C Hefftler, C Neuhold, O Rozenberg, and J Smith, The Palgrave Handbook of National Parliaments and the European 
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4
 F Fabbrini and K Granat ‘Yellow card, but no foul: the role of the national parliaments under the subsidiarity protocol 
and the Commission proposal for an EU regulation on the right to strike’, (2013) Common Market Law Review 50(1): 
115– 143. 
5
 M Goldoni ‘The Early Warning System and the Monti II regulation: the case for a political interpretation’, (2014) 
European Constitutional Law Review 10(1): 90– 108. 
6
 M Bartl ‘The Way We Do Europe: Subsidiarity and the Substantive Democratic Deficit, (2015), European Law Journal, 
21(1): 24. 
7
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order to increase their influence in the EU.
8
 These examples show that disciplinary affiliation does not 
determine an author’s attitude towards the correct use of the procedure. 
There is, however, a deeper and more pervasive difference between the two disciplines, that 
emerges from their respective methodologies. These lead them to address quite different questions, 
which naturally yield different kinds of results. On the whole – at the risk of generalizing – legal 
scholars who study the EWM are interested in how it will affect the legal and constitutional order of 
the EU. When considering a specific case – e.g. a yellow card – they tend to engage in a textual 
analysis of the reasoned opinions of the national parliaments, in order to compare their reasoning to 
that of the Commission. Political scientists, by contrast, are more interested in how the EWM will 
affect political outcomes. They are less interested in the substantive content of reasoned opinions; 
rather, they are more likely to see the EWM as a political tool, and to ask under what circumstances it 
is likely to be wielded by national parliaments and what effect it may have. The contrast between the 
two disciplinary approaches is vividly on display in their respective analyses of the Monti II yellow 
card: whereas legal scholars debate the relative merits of the opinions of the national parliaments and 
the Commission,
9
 political scientists analyse the tools of interparliamentary coordination that were 
activated in order to make the yellow card happen, in addition to debating the political importance of 
the outcome.
10
  
In general, these two disciplinary approaches are complementary, in that each one has its respective 
strengths, and insofar as one may have weaknesses or blind spots these may be compensated for by the 
strengths of the other. For example, it seems that political scientists’ disciplinary perspective allows 
them, on the whole, to adopt a more flexible understanding of subsidiarity within the context of the 
EWM. Legal scholars tend to emphasize the narrow scope of the EWM which, whether they like it or 
not, they perceive as intractable.
11
 Even those who regret such narrowness, expressing a belief that the 
role of national parliaments in EU policy scrutiny should be expanded beyond mere subsidiarity 
control, do not see a way out of the conundrum – at least short of treaty change. They do not see what 
seems obvious to political scientists: that the EWM is a tool which national parliaments may adapt for 
their particular purposes, and that they may reinterpret subsidiarity in a way that allows them to 
challenge an EU legislative proposal on other grounds, such as legal basis, proportionality, and policy 
effectiveness. As it happens, this is the approach to the EWM which many national parliaments have 
taken, as discussed below.  
Another strength of the political scientist’s method is that the rigorous comparison of national 
parliaments’ approaches to the EWM, often using quantitative methods, may yield unexpected 
insights. For example, it is often assumed that it is the “strong” parliaments – those considered to have 
the most institutional capacity to scrutinize their own governments – that would be most likely to 
extend their influence to the EU level by, for example, participating in the EWM. Conversely, it is 
sometimes posited that “weak” parliaments would be more likely to participate because, having little 
national-level influence over their own governments’ conduct of EU affairs, they would instead focus 
their attention on EU-level procedures such as the EWM. However, an empirical analysis of the recent 
use of the EWM shows with bracing clarity that neither supposition turns out to be true: “There was no 
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correlation, negative or positive, between the institutional strength of the chambers and the number of 
opinions they sent within the EWM or the Political Dialogue.”12 Evidently, it is not enough that 
national parliaments are able to act, but they also must be willing. Further studies have attempted to go 
beyond institutional capacity to inquire whether the variation between national parliaments’ propensity 
to participate in the EWM may be explained according to incentive-related factors, such as party-
political contestation or the salience and urgency of draft legislative acts,
13
 or public opinion regarding 
the EU.
14
 Yet such quantitative methods, so beloved of political scientists, cannot analyse more subtle 
differences in the approach of national parliaments to the EWM, including contrasts in their legislative 
cultures and in their normative interpretation of subsidiarity.
15
 To fully understand such differences 
requires a qualitative methodological approach, such as is commonly employed by legal scholars – as 
well as some political scientists – that entails a close, substantive reading of texts, such as the reasoned 
opinions of the national parliaments.  
In lieu of a one-dimensional continuum separating “strong” from “weak” parliaments in varying 
degrees, there have been attempts both by legal scholars and political scientists to develop typologies 
that classify national parliaments according to their differing approaches to EU affairs generally or the 
EWM specifically. One political science study identified “modes of parliamentary activity in EU 
affairs” with which to identify five groups of parliaments/chambers according to which type of activity 
they emphasize in EU affairs, which are: Scrutinizers (scrutiny in committee), Debating arenas 
(plenary debates), Policy shapers (mandates and resolutions), Commission watchdogs (Political 
Dialogue and EWM), and Scrutiny laggards (none). It is the fourth of these that is most relevant for 
scholars of the EWM, because a parliament/chamber that aspires to be a “Commission watchdog” will 
invest its resources in EU-level engagement at the expense of domestic scrutiny. Unfortunately, this 
study did not yield results specific to the EWM, because to arrive at their measure of EU-level 
engagement the authors combined each parliament/chamber’s number of reasoned opinions under the 
EWM with its number of contributions under the Political Dialogue, which tend to be more 
numerous.
16
 As a result, the only “Commission watchdogs” they identify are the Portuguese 
parliament and the Italian Senate, both of which have been particularly active in the Political Dialogue 
but not in the EWM.  
One legal scholar, Philipp Kiiver, produced a typology of four kinds of parliaments/ chambers, 
classified specifically according to how they approach the EWM: the Literalists, who faithfully adhere 
to a narrow check of the subsidiarity compliance of a legislative proposal, as required by the treaty 
(including, e.g. the two Dutch chambers and the French Sénat); the Pseudo-colegislators, who ignore 
the formal limits of the EWM and treat it as a policy consultation (including e.g. the German 
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 K Auel, O Rozenberg and A Tacea, ‘Fighting Back? And, if so, how? Measuring Parliamentary Strength and Activity in 
EU Affairs,’ (2015) in Hefftler et al. The Palgrave Handbook of National Parliaments and the European Union (n 3) 86. 
13
 K Gattermann and C Hefftler ‘Beyond Institutional Capacity: Political Motivation and Parliamentary Behaviour in the 
Early Warning System,’ (2015) West European Politics, 38:2, 305-334. Perhaps the most significant finding of this study 
(at 322), though one not emphasized by the authors, is that the likelihood that any one chamber will pass a reasoned 
opinion under the EWM rises sharply if a large number of other chambers have already done so (statistically, the 
probability is 21% higher if ten other chambers have passed a reasoned opinion than if none have done so). This suggests 
that many parliaments are more likely to pass a reasoned opinion if they think a yellow card is likely, in line with what I 
call a “political bargaining” approach to the EWM (see Section V, below.) 
14
 C Williams 2015 ‘Issuing Reasoned Opinions: The Determinants of Usage of the Early Warning System,’ (2015), ms., 
European University Institute. 
15
 One legal scholar undertook an analysis to see whether the type of scrutiny system employed by a parliament 
(centralised, decentralised, or mixed) affected its level of activity in the EWM, but she found no robust relationship. K 
Granat National Parliaments and the Policing of the Subsidiarity Principle (Ph.D. Dissertation, European University 
Institute, Florence, 2014) 160-161 
16
 During the period examined, 2010-2012, there were more than eight times as many Political Dialogue contributions 
(1324) as reasoned opinions (161). The latter were overshadowed by the former, despite being accorded double weight by 
the study’s authors. Auel et al. ‘Fighting back?’ (n 12) 71, 76.  
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Bundesrat and the UK House of Lords); the Pre-emptors, who generally decline to participate in the 
EWM but choose to react instead to EU consultation documents (e.g. the Nordic parliaments of 
Denmark, Sweden and Finland); and the Absentees, who tend not to participate in the EWM at all 
(mostly parliaments in Southern and Eastern Europe).
17
 There is much to quibble with in this typology, 
including whether the parliaments/chambers cited as examples belong in these categories. For 
example, the three Nordic parliaments, which Kiiver puts together in the same category, have in 
practice acted very differently in the EWM. Measured by the numbers of reasoned opinions passed, 
the Swedish Riksdag has been by far the most active parliament in the EWM, whereas the Finnish 
Eduskunta has been among the least active, and the Danish Folketing has been close to the average.
18
 
It is argued below (Section V) that these three parliaments, while similar in many other ways, actually 
exemplify three very different approaches to the EWM. Moreover, the two Dutch chambers and the 
French Sénat – which Kiiver calls Literalists – raised objections to the EPPO proposal which were 
roundly rejected by the Commission for going beyond the scope of the subsidiarity review.
19
 To be 
fair, Kiiver’s typology was speculative, based not on an analysis of the EWM in operation but on an 
analysis of the subsidiarity tests that were conducted by COSAC between 2004-2009, prior to the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. During the COSAC tests the Dutch chambers did take a 
Literalist approach (similar to what I call Legal Rule-Following in my own typology) but since then 
they have changed their methods, leading to “a politicization of the process, whereby reasoned 
opinions are increasingly used to support or undermine a policy.”20 (In my own typology, below, I 
classify the Tweede Kamer as an exemplar of the Political Bargaining approach.) Another problem is 
that, in practical terms, it may be difficult to distinguish Literalists from Absentees: both types will 
seldom issue reasoned opinions, but for different reasons – the former out of respect for the narrow 
scope of the EWM, and the latter due to a lack of capacity, lack of interest, or both.
21
 But my principal 
complaint about this typology is that it fails to capture the most salient differences between the 
approaches of national parliaments to the EWM, which is a reflection of their disparate approaches to 
the norm of subsidiarity (see Section V).  
III. Should Subsidiarity and the EWM be Implemented by Legal or Political 
Institutions? 
A more practical question concerning the EWM is whether it is and/or ought to be implemented by 
legal institutions (e.g. courts) or by political institutions (e.g. parliaments). This is closely related to 
the question of whether the principle of subsidiarity itself should be interpreted primarily by legal or 
political institutions. The second question predates the first, because subsidiarity was introduced into 
EU law in the Maastricht Treaty (1992), long before the EWM was first devised by the European 
Convention (2002-2003) as a system that would delegate the role of subsidiarity watchdogs to a set of 
political institutions, the national parliaments. During the intervening decade, subsidiarity was a 
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 Commission Communication of 27 November 2013, (COM (2013) 851 final) 5. 
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Watchdog that does not Bark?’ in Hefftler et al. The Palgrave Handbook of National Parliaments and the European 
Union (n 3) 524. 
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subject studied more by legal scholars than by political scientists, and the scholarship focused most 
often on the role of the European Court of Justice in subsidiarity control.
22
  
However, it should be noted that even during this period the official EU position was that the 
primary responsibility for ensuring subsidiarity compliance lay with the EU’s political institutions, and 
not with the ECJ. It is true that while the Maastricht treaty codified the principle in Article 3b TEU, it 
said little about how and by whom it should be implemented. But after a negative referendum result in 
Denmark threw the ratification of Maastricht into doubt, European leaders seized on the treaty’s 
subsidiarity provisions as a means to prove to the public that the EU would respect the autonomy of 
the member states and exercise its powers with self-restraint. To this end, they developed a set of 
substantive and procedural guidelines for the implementation of subsidiarity and proportionality which 
were appended to the European Council conclusions in Edinburgh (1992), and eventually incorporated 
into a protocol attached to the Amsterdam Treaty (1997). The procedural guidelines are addressed to 
the political institutions of the EU:  
[The] Amsterdam protocol… sets out detailed procedural guidelines which require the political 
institutions to give due consideration to subsidiarity and proportionality at each stage of the 
legislative process – that is, whenever a measure is initiated, amended or adopted. The 
Commission, as the institution which formally proposes legislation, must do four things: it must 
consult widely before proposing legislation, justify the relevance of its proposals with regard to 
subsidiarity, minimize the financial and administrative burdens of legislation and submit an annual 
report to the other institutions on the implementation of Article 3b (Art. 9). The European 
Parliament and the Council of Ministers, in turn, are enjoined to consider Commission proposals, 
as well as any suggested amendments, for their compatibility with Article 3b (Art. 11).
23
 
The Amsterdam protocol was silent on the role of the ECJ in the implementation of subsidiarity. 
However, there is little doubt that the ECJ has the authority to interpret the principle, insofar as it is 
incorporated into the EU treaties and is, consequently, justiciable.  
Subsidiarity after Maastricht was implemented as a “norm of self-limiting governance” intended to 
change the legislative culture of the EU so that it legislated less often (subsidiarity per se) and in a less 
intrusive manner (proportionality). It was not a separation-of-powers, “checks and balances” system in 
which an over-zealous legislative branch would be restrained by the countervailing power of the 
judicial branch; rather, the legislative branch (which in this context includes the Commission, with its 
formal right of initiative) was expected to reform itself from within. Many have interpreted the ECJ’s 
steadfast refusal to exercise a robust review of EU legislation for its compliance with the principle as a 
sign that subsidiarity has been ineffective. However, arguably the relevant test of subsidiarity’s post-
Maastricht effectiveness is not whether it was used in judicial review but whether it had an impact on 
the EU’s legislative output. From this perspective, in retrospect, did it work? The Commission, for its 
part, insisted that it made a difference. In its annual reports on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality, published under the rubric of “Better Lawmaking,” it cited a year-on-
year decline in the number of Commission proposals for new legislation during this period – the 
number fell by more than half between 1990 and 2002 – as evidence that a changed legislative culture 
had taken hold in the EU.
24
 Indeed, there was a concomitant decline in the overall volume of EU 
legislation over the same period, which could be taken as evidence that subsidiarity was having an 
effect.
25
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 See the Commission report of 12 December 2003, Better Lawmaking 2003 (COM 770 final) 31. 
25
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However, whatever the practical impact of subsidiarity after Maastricht, it was perceived as 
inadequate; for this reason, part of the mandate of the European Convention was to improve the 
implementation of the principle of subsidiarity. The Convention created a “Working Group” on 
subsidiarity, which directly addressed the question of whether a new subsidiarity control mechanism 
should be “legal” or “political” in nature, for example by determining which kinds of institutions – 
judicial, technical, or political – should be involved in its implementation: 
[The] working group on subsidiarity considered but ultimately rejected subsidiarity review 
mechanisms of a largely technocratic or judicial nature. These included: the creation of a new, ad 
hoc body to monitor the application of the principle of subsidiarity; the appointment within the 
Commission of a ‘Mr or Mrs Subsidiarity’; the creation of an ad hoc chamber within the ECJ 
responsible for questions of subsidiarity; and an ex ante judicial mechanism to scrutinize an EU 
legislative act after it is adopted but before it enters into force. These mechanisms were found 
unsuitable because the working group agreed that subsidiarity is ‘a principle of an essentially 
political nature’ … which should be monitored by political institutions.
26
 
In place of a judicial or technocratic solution, the Convention quite deliberately devised the EWM as a 
system involving political institutions, making national parliaments into subsidiarity watchdogs. That 
much is obvious. Moreover, they are political institutions with a particular bias: they may be expected, 
on balance, to favour an interpretation of subsidiarity that restrains the actions of the EU. This is 
because when the EU takes action in policy fields where competence is shared with the member states, 
this necessarily encroaches on national parliaments’ own field of action. It is fair to presume, then, that 
national parliaments were chosen not as disinterested arbiters but precisely because they have an 
interest in promoting certain kinds of outcomes.
27
  
From this perspective the EWM marks a change in the EU’s approach to subsidiarity, bringing it 
closer to a “checks and balances” system. Unlike the post-Maastricht approach, which attempted to 
change the EU’s legislative culture from within, the EWM empowers a group of external political 
actors as a restraining force. Of course, by this standard it is quite a weak “check” on EU legislation. 
That was especially true of the version that emerged in the Constitutional Treaty, which was merely 
advisory. As originally designed, national parliaments’ only means of intervention in the EU 
legislative process was a “yellow card,” wherein one third of them (with a voting system adjusted to 
allow for bicameralism) could force the review of a legislative proposal that allegedly violates the 
principle of subsidiarity; this is effectively advisory because the proposing institution, usually the 
Commission, is not required to withdraw the proposal but may instead amend it or maintain it 
unchanged. In the transition to the Treaty of Lisbon, the EWM was strengthened to also include the 
possibility of an “orange card”: if a majority of national parliaments raise subsidiarity-based 
objections to a proposal, this triggers a vote in the EU’s two legislative chambers, either of which may 
immediately vote to reject it (by a vote of 55% of the members of the Council, or by a majority of 
votes cast in the EP). The addition of the orange card still did not give national parliaments a veto over 
EU legislation – it is not a “red card” – but it did nonetheless increase their influence within the EU 
legislative process, insofar as their intervention can lead to the rejection of a proposal if another of the 
principal EU institutions may be persuaded to agree. National parliaments would only need to 
convince the Commission to withdraw the proposal, or either the Council or the EP to vote it down. 
Arguably, empowering national parliaments in this way made them EU-level actors in their own right, 
and collectively a “virtual third chamber” for the EU. For the present discussion, the point to 
emphasize is that the addition of the “orange card” reinforced the political nature of the EWM, insofar 
as it left the ultimate decision over a contested proposal in the hands of political institutions – i.e. the 
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Commission, which despite its technocratic pedigree is a thoroughly political institution, and the 
Council and the EP, the two bodies which together constitute the “EU legislator.”28  
Up to this point we have not discussed the ECJ – obviously a legal, rather than political, institution 
– which is also ascribed a role by the treaty in subsidiarity control. My description of the EWM as a 
procedure that only involves “political” institutions requires a certain sleight of hand, in that it depends 
on defining the EWM as the procedure set out only in Articles 6 and 7 of Protocol 2 (TEU/TFEU). 
The role of the ECJ is set out in Article 8, which states that the ECJ 
shall have jurisdiction in actions on grounds of infringement of the principle of subsidiarity by a 
legislative act, brought… by Member States, or notified by them in accordance with their legal 
order on behalf of their national Parliament or a chamber thereof.  
Since Maastricht it had been widely accepted that the ECJ had jurisdiction over the judicial 
interpretation of the relevant subsidiarity provisions of the treaty; the innovation in this article is to 
state that such actions may be brought by a member state “on behalf of” its national parliament or a 
chamber thereof. This gives national parliaments the standing of “indirect semi-privileged applicants” 
before the ECJ – indirect because they must bring the action of annulment via their governments, and 
semi-privileged because it only concerns one of their institutional prerogatives, subsidiarity control.
29
  
For this provision of the treaty to have practical consequences, two things must happen. First, 
national parliaments must bring actions – or, more precisely, they must request that their governments 
bring actions – to the ECJ challenging the subsidiarity compliance of EU legislation. Second, the ECJ 
must prove willing to seriously consider such challenges. The first of these seems quite likely to 
happen sooner or later, particularly in the case of an EU legislative proposal that has passed into law 
despite the subsidiarity-based objections of one or several national parliaments. However, the second 
occurrence is much less likely, given the ECJ’s reluctance to touch the issue. Imagine, for a moment, 
the circumstances: if the legislation in question were passed by the ordinary legislative procedure, this 
would presumably mean that the Commission, Council and EP had all broadly supported the measure 
– support which implies that all three have endorsed the measure’s compliance with subsidiarity. The 
ECJ would be accused of rampant judicial activism if it were to take the side of a disgruntled national 
parliament to, in effect, overrule the considered opinion of the three principal political institutions of 
the EU.
30
 Historically, the ECJ has also been extremely reluctant to disapply an EU law for lacking a 
legal basis in the EU treaties, even though its authority to do so is unequivocal, and the legal principle 
at stake – that of conferral – is relatively clear. In the case of a subsidiarity-based challenge, both its 
authority and the principle at stake would be much more ambiguous.  
This example raises a broader question that is central to this debate: under the rules of Protocol 2, 
who has final authority over the application of the principle of subsidiarity – political institutions or 
legal institutions? Within the EWM – by which I refer simply to the system of reasoned opinions, 
yellow cards, and orange cards – the application of the principle of subsidiarity is entirely in the hands 
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of political institutions, although no single institution has final interpretive authority. In the first 
instance it is a dialogue – or more pointedly, an argument – between the Commission and the national 
parliaments: the institution proposing new legislation, almost always the Commission, must justify the 
proposal with respect to subsidiarity; national parliaments may respond with reasoned opinions 
challenging the Commission’s justifications; and the Commission must respond to national 
parliaments with further justifications of its position. In the case of a yellow card, the Commission 
must choose whether to maintain, amend, or withdraw the proposal; if it chooses to maintain or 
amend, the final decision on the proposal – also by implication a decision on its subsidiarity 
compliance – is in the hands of the Council and the EP. In the case of an orange card, if the 
Commission chooses to maintain the proposal, its fate then lies with the Council and the EP, either of 
which may immediately vote it down. In this way, the ex ante application of the subsidiarity principle 
is in the hands of political institutions. However, could it be said that a legal institution, the ECJ, has 
the ultimate say over the ex post application of subsidiarity, by virtue of its standing as the final 
interpretive authority of the EU treaties? Recall the example cited above. If the ECJ disagrees with the 
national parliament’s contention that the EU law in question violates subsidiarity, it would not, as a 
legal institution, be asserting its own interpretation of subsidiarity over that of a political institution, 
the national parliament. It would be more apt to say that the ECJ would be deferring to the 
interpretation of subsidiarity endorsed by the principal political institutions of the EU – the 
Commission, Council, and EP.  
IV. Should Subsidiarity and the EWM Entail a Political or Legal Mode of Reasoning? 
Whereas previous questions (legal scholars vs. political scientists, political vs. legal institutions) were 
something of a diversion, here I think we come to the heart of the matter regarding the nature of the 
subsidiarity review. Even if it is conceded that the EWM is a procedure that mostly or entirely 
involves political institutions, this still leaves open the question of whether it entails a form of 
reasoning that is essentially legal or political. How should the participants in the EWM approach the 
problem? Some have argued that national parliaments – which are, evidently, political institutions – 
must nonetheless act like legal institutions when they participate in the EWM. Kiiver has said that 
national parliaments in the EWM engage in “what can best be described as legal review”: they 
“…behave in a court-like manner, accepting or at least attempting to use subsidiarity as a legal 
principle.”31 On the other hand, national parliaments could approach the EWM simply as an 
opportunity to influence policy and legislative outcomes at the EU level, as participants in a “virtual 
third chamber.”32  
Here I will set aside certain procedural questions concerning the nature of the subsidiarity review, 
such as whether inadequate justification of a measure should itself be treated as a subsidiarity breach, 
or whether the parts of a legislative package should be considered separately or together. Rather, I 
wish to focus on the most important substantive questions that arise in the EWM. What is the nature of 
the subsidiarity norm? What is its relationship to the “adjacent” treaty principles of proportionality and 
conferral?
33
 What is its relationship to the broader political principles of policy effectiveness and 
political expediency? And is it justifiable for national parliaments to raise these other issues in their 
reasoned opinions under the EWM? 
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Subsidiarity 
First of all, what is the nature of the principle of subsidiarity? What is, as it were, its ontological 
status? This has been the subject of a great deal of philosophical rumination, as subsidiarity has origins 
in the social teachings of the Roman Catholic Church and deeper roots in European thought, extending 
back to Thomas Aquinas and even Aristotle.
34
 But here we will focus on the concept as it is commonly 
used in the constitutional parlance and political practice of the EU – where it remains deeply 
contested. Perhaps the first question to ask is, is subsidiarity determinate? Is it possible to discover, 
with some degree of certainty (or at least confidence) exactly which potential actions of the EU are 
permitted or proscribed by subsidiarity? Some find it to be an endlessly malleable concept so open to 
interpretation that it could allow almost any course of action to be either prohibited or permitted (or 
even required). The opposing view is that subsidiarity, at least as it is defined in the EU treaties, is 
relatively straightforward and concrete. A middle view is that subsidiarity is “vague but not 
meaningless,” whose requirements are not self-evident but may be discovered and elaborated through 
a rational, analytical process (such as an impact assessment) or even through an interpretive and/or 
adversarial process, such as the EWM.  
This leads to the question of whether the subsidiarity is a “legal” norm or something different – a 
“political” norm, for lack of a better term. This question also concerns its relationship to the adjacent 
principles of conferral and proportionality. It will be recalled that EU actions are governed by these 
three principles, first codified in the Maastricht Treaty. In theory the EU legislator is required to ask 
three consecutive questions before legislating: First (principle of conferral), does the EU have the 
legal power, conferred by the treaty, to take action in a given circumstance? Second (principle of 
subsidiarity), is EU action appropriate in this instance? Third (principle of proportionality), are the 
means chosen the least burdensome required to achieve the purpose? It is possible to view all three 
principles as similar in kind, as legal principles that demarcate, in progressively finer detail, the 
boundary that separates the EU’s field of competence from that of the member states.  
Yet a different perspective is that the latter two principles are different in kind from the first: that 
even after it is determined that the EU has the power under the treaty to act, it is still subject to certain 
constraints concerning whether it should do so (subsidiarity) and, if so, to what extent 
(proportionality). Even if EU action is legal, it is not necessarily appropriate. The idea that the latter 
two principles are different from the first was underlined in the Lisbon Treaty, when it stated, “The 
limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral. The use of Union 
competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.” Subsidiarity and 
proportionality could be seen as together comprising a “norm of self-limiting governance” placing 
normative limits on the actions of the EU: in fields where competence is shared between the EU and 
the member states, the EU should only take action when necessary (subsidiarity); and in all fields, it 
should act in the least intrusive way (proportionality). In other words, the EU has some political 
discretion in the manner in which it uses its legal powers, and it ought to do so with self-restraint. 
Looked at in this way, the boundary separating the EU’s field of competence from that of the member 
states is not a precisely demarcated borderline but rather an indistinct frontier insofar as EU action 
may or may not be warranted under particular circumstances – indeed, the actions of the EU may 
expand and recede in response to changing circumstances.
35
  
Arguably, the decision of whether and how to legislate involves a different kind of reasoning from 
the determination of whether a legal basis for such legislation exists. It involves political judgement to 
decide whether it is preferable for action to be taken at the EU level or left to the member states. If so, 
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then it is not only the case that the EWM chiefly involves political institutions, as pointed out above, 
but also that these should adopt a political form of reasoning within it. National parliamentarians need 
not think and act “in a court-like manner.” Rather, they need only think and act like legislators. If this 
analysis of subsidiarity is correct, it would also justify the ECJ’s reticence with respect to subsidiarity: 
its reluctance to police the principle may be read simply as deferring to the judgement of the EU’s 
political institutions as to how it should be interpreted and implemented. 
Another question concerning subsidiarity is whether this principle can be separated from, or is 
inextricably linked to, related principles that are used as criteria by which to judge an EU legislative 
proposal, which are: proportionality, conferral, policy effectiveness, and political expediency. This is a 
philosophical question concerning the ontological status of subsidiarity, but it also has practical 
implications for the EWM. The European Commission insists that the EWM should be confined to the 
principle of subsidiarity, and that if national parliaments wish to raise objections on these other 
grounds they should do so through the Political Dialogue.
36
 The position of at least some national 
parliaments, whether stated explicitly or implied in their reasoned opinions, is that it is legitimate to 
raise these other concerns because they are so closely related to subsidiarity that they are an intrinsic 
part of the review of a measure’s subsidiarity compliance. From this perspective, the correct 
understanding of subsidiarity is as a principle with a broad scope that to some extent encompasses 
these other concerns which become, by extension, elements of the review process under the EWM. 
However, each of the four above-mentioned criteria entails a somewhat different argument for its 
inclusion. Let us examine them one by one. 
Proportionality 
Proportionality is the “sister principle” to subsidiarity in EU law: the two are paired together in the 
Lisbon Treaty’s “Protocol (no. 2) on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality.” Indeed, the protocol stipulates that, “Each institution shall ensure constant respect for 
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality” (Art. 1), and that, “Draft legislative acts shall be 
justified with regard to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality” (Art. 4). But when setting 
out the specifics of the EWM (Art. 6-7) and appeal before the ECJ (Art. 8), proportionality is excluded 
and subsidiarity is the sole principle at issue in the national parliaments’ reasoned opinions or any 
further action of the Commission, the EU legislator (Council and EP) or the ECJ.  
There is a logic to this exclusion. In the simplest terms, the subsidiarity question is either/or: to 
claim that a legislative proposal violates subsidiarity is to allege, in effect, that no legislation is 
needed. By contrast, to claim a proportionality violation is to object to the proposal in its current form 
– as overly intrusive or burdensome – but at the same time to agree, in effect, that some legislation 
may be necessary. Confining the review to subsidiarity makes it easier to treat all reasoned opinions as 
equivalent, as votes against a legislative proposal to be tallied towards a yellow or an orange card. To 
include proportionality would turn the system into a dialogue, with national parliaments offering 
constructive criticism as to how the legislation should be improved.
37
 By this logic, objections purely 
on proportionality grounds should be excluded from the EWM and made in the context of the Political 
Dialogue. 
However, there are cracks in this logic. The protocol states that, when faced with a yellow card, the 
Commission (or other proposing body) must review the proposal, after which it has three options: it 
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may decide “to maintain, amend or withdraw the draft” (Art. 7(2)). However, if national parliaments 
object purely on subsidiarity grounds – arguing that no legislation is needed – then surely the 
Commission should only have two options, either to maintain or withdraw, because the reasoned 
opinions would provide no guidance as to how to amend the proposal.
38
 What this example suggests is 
that the distinction between subsidiarity and proportionality is not nearly so clear-cut. Indeed, some 
have noted that the treaty’s definition of subsidiarity also includes an element of proportionality, 
stating that, “the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot 
be sufficiently achieved by the Member States” (Art. 5(3) TEU, emphasis added).39 Some national 
parliaments agree. The Swedish Riksdag’s Committee on the Constitution has stated that the above 
wording implies that subsidiarity control also includes aspects of proportionality; in a concrete 
example, the Riksdag’s Committee on Transport and Communications submitted a reasoned opinion 
on proportionality grounds, stating among other things that the proposal (on high-speed electronic 
communications networks) should have employed a less intrusive legislative instrument – a directive 
instead of a regulation.
40
 However, the Commission maintains that such arguments are out of place in 
the EWM; such was its response, in the case of the second yellow card, to the French Sénat which had 
passed a reasoned opinion expressing approval for the creation of a European Public Prosecutor’s 
Office but questioning certain elements of the proposal.
41
  
Conferral 
As noted above, the question of whether the EU has the legal power to take action is different in kind 
from whether such action is appropriate in a given circumstance: whereas conferral governs the 
“limits” of Union competences, subsidiarity (along with proportionality) governs their “use” (Art. 5(1) 
TEU). It has been argued that if a legislative proposal does not have a correct legal basis in the EU 
treaties then it also, by definition, violates the principle of subsidiarity; by extension, it is perfectly 
valid for a national parliament to allege a breach of the principle of conferral in a reasoned opinion 
under the EWM.
42
 On the other hand, it may be argued that while national parliaments are well-
equipped for the task of subsidiarity control, they do not have the expertise to assess the legal basis of 
a legislative proposal in comparison either to the ECJ or the EU’s political institutions.43  
However, it is not always possible to draw a neat line separating the principles of conferral and 
subsidiarity. Many supposed that the introduction of subsidiarity into the EU treaty would lead to a 
wholesale reordering of competences between the EU and the member states. Indeed, the Laeken 
Declaration, which set out the mandate of the European Convention, seemed to conflate conferral and 
subsidiarity when it tasked the Convention to examine the role of national parliaments, asking among 
other things whether they should “…focus on the division of competence between Union and Member 
States, for example through preliminary checking of compliance with the principle of subsidiarity?”44 
Because most EU competences are shared with the member states, when the EU takes action in those 
areas it is to some extent staking out new territory along the frontier that separates the two spheres of 
competence. The fact is that many national parliaments review the legal basis of EU legislative 
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proposals as part of their review under the EWM. On the other hand, the Commission “…has thus far 
never been materially influenced by the legal basis arguments raised by national parliaments.”45  
A concrete example demonstrates some of the difficulties of separating the review of a measure’s 
subsidiarity compliance from that of its legal basis. The Monti II Regulation regarding the right to 
strike, the object of the first yellow card, received twelve reasoned opinions from national parliaments, 
with at least ten of them also raising objections concerning its legal basis.
46
 The Commission had 
grounded the proposal in Article 352 TFEU, the “flexibility clause,” which gives the EU the power to 
legislate if action “…should prove necessary, within the framework of the policies defined in the 
Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the 
necessary powers.” The Commission justified its use of this “catch-all” provision on the grounds that 
even though the treaty does not empower the EU to pass legislation to regulate the right to strike – it is 
excluded from the relevant treaty article –the ECJ had decided that this right was nevertheless subject 
to EU law, and may be abridged if it conflicts with the economic freedoms of the internal market. 
When a proposal is based on Article 352, questions related to its compliance with the principles of 
conferral and subsidiarity respectively are difficult to disentangle. Whereas conferral concerns the 
limits of EU competences and subsidiarity concerns their use, this distinction breaks down when the 
flexibility clause is employed, because its use has the effect of redefining the limits of the legislative 
competence of the EU.  
Policy Effectiveness 
A broader question to be asked is whether it would be legitimate for national parliaments to use the 
EWM to object to EU legislative proposals on more explicitly political grounds. The principles of 
conferral and proportionality are “adjacent” to subsidiarity in the sense that the three of them appear 
together in Article 5 TEU as consecutive tests of the appropriateness of EU legislation; they are 
closely related to subsidiarity, even though observers disagree as to whether it is valid for national 
parliaments to invoke them in their reasoned opinions under the EWM. But all three of these 
principles could be construed as representing narrow, technical questions that are far removed from 
the primary concerns of national parliaments, i.e. the content of the proposal and its political 
implications. However, I believe it is too vague to put all “political” objections into a single, general 
category. Here let us make an important distinction between objections to an EU proposal based on 
doubts about whether it will achieve its stated objective (policy effectiveness) and objections based on 
the values and/or interests of the parliaments or parliamentarians concerned (political expediency).  
Policy effectiveness is simply the principle that legislation should be designed to achieve its stated 
purposes. Far from being a legal or technical question, the policy effectiveness criterion is focused 
squarely on the substantive content of a proposal. Now, is this criterion a valid ground for a national 
parliament to submit a reasoned opinion under the EWM? An objection to a legislative proposal on 
these grounds would not primarily be about competence, but rather a claim that it is fundamentally 
misconceived or unworkable. In a way it would be similar to a proportionality objection, in that the 
parliament in question could agree with the policy ends that the measure is supposed to achieve, but 
disagree with the means chosen to achieve it; however, rather than claiming that the proposal is too 
burdensome or intrusive, the parliament would be saying that it is ill-designed. In an EWM with a 
narrow scope, such as is favoured by the Commission, such an objection would be out of bounds. Yet 
if one looks carefully at the relevant treaty provision it seems to require a legislative proposal must 
meet the test of policy effectiveness in order to be compliant with the principle of subsidiarity. After 
all, it is commonly interpreted as containing two separate tests, those of “insufficiency” and 
“comparative effectiveness”: 
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Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, 
by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level (Article 5 
(2) TEU). 
These two tests, which are inter-related, stipulate that EU action should take place only when member 
state action is insufficient and the objectives of the proposed action can be “better achieved” at EU 
level. Needless to say, if a proposed EU action fails the test of policy effectiveness, then it also fails 
the “comparative effectiveness” test, and thus does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity.  
But isn’t almost any proposed EU action likely to be far more effective than a patchwork of 
member state laws? In response, let us look again at the case of the Monti II Regulation. One of the 
common complaints (among many) of the national parliaments in their reasoned opinions was that this 
proposal simply would not work. They said, in effect, that it was logically incoherent, and for this 
reason would not achieve the stated objective of the legislation, which was to “clarify” the law 
regarding the right to strike. To understand their point, we must delve into the substance of the 
proposal. The legislation was a response to ECJ decisions (Viking, Laval, and others) dealing with 
situations where labour unions had taken collective action targeting cross-border businesses – where, 
in other words, the right to strike was in conflict with internal market freedoms (the freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services). The ECJ recognized the right to strike but 
declared that it was not absolute, and must give way to internal market freedoms in certain 
circumstances. The Commission intended to remedy the resulting legal uncertainty by regulating the 
right to strike with positive EU legislation, without fundamentally altering the legal status quo 
established by the ECJ decisions. And so the Commission proposed the Monti II Regulation, which 
included language (Article 2 of the proposal) intended to explain that the right to strike and internal 
market freedoms coexist, and that each “shall respect” the other: 
The exercise of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services enshrined in the 
Treaty shall respect the fundamental right to take collective action, including the right or freedom 
to strike, and conversely, the exercise of the fundamental right to take collective action, including 
the right or freedom to strike, shall respect these economic freedoms.
47
 
This Solomonic pronouncement – the crux of the Monti II proposal – recognizes that these two 
fundamental values coexist, implicitly in tension with one another, but it does not state which should 
take precedence over the other.
48
  
The complaint of many national parliaments was in effect that the Monti II Regulation was 
misconceived, insofar as it would not achieve its stated objective of clarifying the relationship between 
the right to strike and the economic freedoms of the internal market. The Danish Folketing stated that 
the provision “does not provide further clarity”49 regarding the relationship between these two 
principles, a sentiment echoed later in the reasoned opinion of the Dutch Tweede Kamer.
50
 The 
Luxembourg Chambre des Députés remarked that in Article 2, “the two general principles seem to 
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neutralize each other.”51 The Latvian Saiema noted that the text is “not unmistakably clear and 
definite,” citing Article 2 as an example.52 The Maltese Parliament wrote: “The Regulation does not 
clarify.”53 Some parliaments explicitly connect subsidiarity with policy effectiveness, making clear 
that the measure fails the subsidiarity test precisely because it would not achieve its stated goal: for 
example, the Finnish Eduskunta’s reasoned opinion stated that the proposal 
fails, in its current wording to meet its goal of clarifying the current legal situation (the Laval and 
Viking Line cases). Consequently, the proposal is contrary to the principle of subsidiarity and 
proportionality.
54
 
Probably the most cogent critique along these lines came from the Swedish Riksdag. The reasoned 
opinion is worth quoting at length: 
The key provision of the proposal is Article 2 that basically states that the exercise of economic 
freedoms should be consistent with the exercise of the right to collective action, including the right 
to strike, and vice versa. The Riksdag has difficulty seeing how the proposal, in its current state, 
contributes to the clarification of the relationship between liberties and rights that is the proposal’s 
purpose according to the explanatory memorandum. The Riksdag cannot see either that the 
regulation would create greater legal certainty in this regard. Nor can the Riksdag see how the 
proposal would be “reducing tensions between the national industrial relation systems and the 
freedom to provide services” which is stated as essentially the basis of the proposal. It is thus 
difficult to see how the proposal could help achieve any of the objectives referred to in the Treaty, 
which is a prerequisite for the flexibility clause to be used.
55
 
The Riksdag focused on the “policy effectiveness” criterion as it is implicit in Article 352 (the 
flexibility clause), but its reasoning could just as easily be applied to the test of comparative 
effectiveness in Article 5 (2) TEU.  
It should be emphasized that an objection on the basis of the policy effectiveness is different both 
from an objection on principle to any EU action, and from a purely political objection that the proposal 
runs against the interests and/or values of the parliament involved.
56
 Many on the left would have 
preferred that instead of attempting to balance the right to strike with the economic freedoms, the 
legislation should simply have asserted that the first takes precedence over the second; certainly, such 
a formulation would reflect the political preferences of some parliamentary chambers, but it also 
would also be more likely to clarify the legal situation, which would make for more coherent 
legislation that would be, by extension, compliant with subsidiarity. This seems to have been the 
position of the French Sénat, which stated in its reasoned opinion that in order to make the proposal 
comply with subsidiarity, Article 2 should be redrafted to state only that the exercise of the freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services respect the fundamental right to collective action, 
including the right to strike.
57
 However, even if the proposal were redrafted in this way its 
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effectiveness would still be uncertain, because ordinary legislation cannot necessarily overturn the 
decisions in Viking and Laval which were based on the ECJ’s interpretations of the relevant 
provisions of the EU treaties. For this reason, the European Trades Union Congress actually proposed 
changing the EU treaties to add a Social Progress Protocol stating clearly that the right to strike takes 
precedence over the economic freedoms.
58
 Of course, this would involve a far more burdensome legal 
instrument than Monti II, a treaty amendment rather than a regulation, and thus would tend in the 
opposite direction from the principle of proportionality. Even so, such a proposal would arguably be 
more likely to meet the test of policy effectiveness insofar as it would bring clarity to the relationship 
between the right to strike and the economic freedoms.  
Political Expediency 
There is yet one more general reason that a national parliament might use the EWM to raise objections 
to an EU legislative proposal – if it is judged to contravene the values and/or interests of a majority of 
its members. Theoretically, such an argument could be “purely political,” entirely separate from the 
principles of conferral, proportionality, and even policy effectiveness. Let us suppose, for the sake of 
argument, that a national parliament agreed that the EU had the legal power to take action in a given 
area (conferral), that the proposal in question was proportionate to the ends sought (proportionality) 
and likely to achieve its stated goal (policy effectiveness), but still objected to it on ideological 
grounds and/or because it ran against the interests of an important constituency, however defined. In 
such a case, the parliament could even agree that some EU action is indeed necessary (thus passing the 
subsidiarity test, narrowly defined) but disagree with the particular course of action chosen. In such 
circumstances the parliament could be inclined to use the EWM simply as a political tool with which 
to oppose the measure. Of course, the Commission’s view is that such opposition should instead be 
channelled through the Political Dialogue. But the parliament may prefer to use the EWM after 
observing that the Commission is more likely to take their concerns seriously if they are put formally 
in a reasoned opinion rather than a contribution to the Political Dialogue. Certainly, in the case of a 
yellow card the Commission is legally required to respond to national parliaments’ concerns, though 
not necessarily to accede to them. Now, would it be illegitimate for a national parliament to 
“knowingly” object to an EU legislative proposal on purely political grounds – under, as it were, false 
pretenses?  
Even if it seems to violate the letter of the EU treaties, a purely political approach to the EWM is 
defensible – certainly on pragmatic grounds, but also even on the grounds of democratic legitimacy. 
Pragmatically, national parliaments might justify their actions by noting that they are only doing their 
job to the best of their ability by making use every tool at their disposal, in defense of the values 
and/or interests of their constituents. They might also argue, also pragmatically, that they should make 
maximal use of the limited powers bestowed on them by the EU treaties; this has been, in effect, the 
strategy of the European Parliament over decades, allowing it to parlay its initially limited powers into 
significant influence – and, eventually, much more substantial powers. Furthermore, they could argue 
that the democratic legitimacy of the EU is enhanced by the increased involvement of national 
parliaments in its legislative process via the EWM; this, again, is similar to the arguments made 
historically in order to justify the European Parliament’s use of its powers to the maximum. After all, a 
large part of the rationale for giving national parliaments a direct role in EU politics was that this 
would somehow reduce the democratic deficit. The design of the EWM was, at the very least, 
ambiguous as to whether its main purpose was to improve the democratic legitimacy of the EU or the 
subsidiarity compliance of EU legislation.
59
 By these standards a national parliament would be 
justified even in a willful misuse of the EWM to achieve purely political goals. 
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Yet in practice it is difficult to separate purely politically-motivated objections to a proposal from 
those based on a sincere belief that does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. If a national 
parliament is convinced that a proposal is truly odious, contravening the core values or interests of its 
constituents, then it will be loath to accept that it passes the test of “necessity” and is consequently 
subsidiarity-compliant. It is difficult to identify empirical cases where it can be said with certainty that 
a parliamentary chamber adopted a reasoned opinion for purely political motives, merely using 
subsidiarity as a pretext. This is even true in cases where it seems obvious to some commentators that 
the legislative proposal at issue unquestionably complies with subsidiarity. The subsidiarity-
compliance of the Monti II Regulation was taken as self-evident by the Commission – which initially 
declined even to respond individually to the arguments of national parliaments – and other observers, 
because it dealt with cross-border issues that could only be regulated at the EU-level.
60
 Similarly, the 
proposal to create the EPPO was thought by many to easily pass the subsidiarity test, given that this 
body – whose creation is clearly authorized by the treaty – must by definition be an EU-level entity. If 
these proposals are taken to be self-evidently subsidiarity compliant then the implication is the actions 
of national parliaments in passing reasoned opinions is brazenly political, and in effect a misuse of the 
EWM. Yet in both these cases many national parliaments at least managed to muster cogent arguments 
to make the case that they in fact ran afoul of subsidiarity.  
What this section has shown is that the ontological status of subsidiarity remains contested, and this 
has practical effects for the EWM. National parliaments often disagree with the Commission (and 
among themselves) as to how to define subsidiarity, both in itself and in its relationship to a number of 
related principles. National parliaments have at various times used these other principles – 
proportionality, conferral, policy effectiveness, and political expediency – as a basis for their 
objections to EU proposals in their reasoned opinions. It is important to acknowledge that 
justifications may be found both for a narrow EWM focused strictly on subsidiarity, and for a broad 
EWM that also may include these other principles. However, even within the latter “broad” approach 
it is also important to distinguish between a position maintaining that subsidiarity as a concept is so 
flexible that it is essentially meaningless, and one in which subsidiarity is still a useful concept in that 
it is “vague but not meaningless.” In the first of these, the distinction between subsidiarity and these 
other principles collapses, so that an objection on subsidiarity grounds is effectively indistinguishable 
from an objection on the grounds of political expediency. In the second, subsidiarity is still a distinct 
principle, while it overlaps with the principles of proportionality, conferral and policy effectiveness 
(but not political expediency). Looked at in this way, we may discern three approaches to the EWM 
based on whether one conceives of subsidiarity as definite, elastic or ambiguous. 
V. Three Approaches to the EWM: Legal Rule-Following, Political Bargaining, and 
Policy Arguing 
The forgoing analysis has brought to the fore many of the complex questions that are subsumed within 
the debate over whether the EWM is fundamentally a legal or a political procedure. In the remaining 
pages I will build upon the previous analysis in order to construct my own typology of approaches to 
the EWM. I posit that rather than there being merely two approaches, legal and political, it is more 
useful to conceive of three, one “legal” approach and two different “political” approaches. This builds 
on an analysis that was published a decade ago, based on the version of the EWM in the Constitutional 
Treaty, years before it was strengthened (with the addition of the orange card) in the Treaty of Lisbon 
and finally put into practice; that analysis speculated that if and when the EWM came into force, it 
could take shape either as a system in which national parliaments merely use it as a tool to oppose 
legislative proposals that they dislike (now referred to as “political bargaining”), or a system in which 
national parliaments engage in a constructive argument with the Commission over when and how the 
                                                     
60
 See the letter from Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič to national parliaments,12 September 2012. The Adoptive Parents, 
‘The Life of a Death Foretold’ (n 48). F Fabbrini and K Granat ‘Yellow card, but no foul’ (n 4). 
Ian Cooper 
18 
EU should legislate (now referred to as “policy arguing”).61 Now that the EWM has come into 
operation, these two approaches (both of which are broadly “political”) may be glimpsed in the actions 
of some of the parliamentary chambers participating in the EWM. Yet there is also a third, broadly 
“legal” approach, approved most notably by the Commission and certain other parliamentary 
chambers, in which the participants set out to ascertain how subsidiarity should be applied in a given 
circumstance, and then put it into practice (which I will call “legal rule-following”). Each of these 
three approaches depends on its own particular understanding of subsidiarity. Looking back, what is 
perhaps most surprising is that even after five years of being in operation, the EWM has still not 
“taken shape” as one type of system or another, as there remains profound disagreement among the 
participants as to its nature and purpose. What follows is an attempt to map out this disagreement. 
Some points of clarification should be made before describing this three-way typology in detail. 
First, the use of the term “approaches” may imply that I am aiming to categorize the varying 
parliamentary chambers according to their actions in the EWM. Yet, strictly speaking, these three are 
not traits or attitudes that inhere in individual actors; rather, they are modes of interaction, and are 
inherently social. This typology is based on a theory developed by Thomas Risse
62
 in which there are 
three logics of social action governing different social situations, each of which involves a different 
form of rationality, leading to the adoption of a different kind of behaviour: the logic of 
appropriateness (normative rationality, rule-following behaviour), the logic of consequences 
(instrumental rationality, bargaining behaviour) and the logic of arguing (argumentative rationality, 
arguing behaviour).
63
 These are ideal types, and any real-life social situation will involve a mixture of 
these three logics and their concomitant forms of rationality and behaviour. This is also true of the 
three approaches to be outlined here, each of which may be glimpsed at various times in the real-life 
interaction of the participants in the EWM. Indeed, this is a large part of the problem why, even after 
five years, there is still no consensus on how the participants in the EWM should conduct themselves 
or what they should expect it to accomplish. The reason that confusion continues to reign in the EWM 
is that the participants do not agree on what kind of interaction it is, and what social rules should 
apply. 
The three approaches – legal rule-following, political bargaining, and policy arguing – are sketched 
out here (see Table 1). Each approach entails a different understanding of the principle of subsidiarity, 
its relationship to other related principles and its normative implications. The differing interpretations 
of subsidiarity have practical consequences for how national parliaments interact with the Commission 
and with one another. While I will not attempt to categorize all national parliamentary chambers 
according to the three approaches, I will give examples of EWM participants that come closest to each 
of them. 
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Table 1. Three Approaches to the EWM 
 Legal Rule-
Following 
Political Bargaining Policy Arguing 
Logic of Social Action Logic of 
Appropriateness 
Logic of 
Consequences 
Logic of Arguing 
How clear are 
substantive 
requirements of 
subsidiarity?  
Definite: 
Self-evident, or 
determinable through 
process of 
consultation, impact 
assessment 
Elastic: 
Very unclear – Open 
to multiple, 
competing 
interpretations 
Ambiguous: 
Somewhat unclear –
may be clarified 
through the process of 
EWM itself 
Subsidiarity vis-à-vis 
Related Principles? 
Separate: (Other 
Concerns Raised in 
Political Dialogue) 
Continuous (including 
with Political 
Expediency) 
Overlapping (with 
Conferral, 
Proportionality, 
Policy Effectiveness) 
National parliaments 
see Commission as… 
Partner Adversary Interlocutor 
Relationship among 
national parliaments 
Disregarding Coalition-building Persuading 
Ideal Result of NPs’ 
Intervention 
Intervene to Prevent 
Manifest Errors 
Become Veto-Players 
on Salient Issues 
Reshape Proposals, 
Improve Public Policy  
Exemplary Actors Commission, Finnish 
Eduskunta  
Danish Folketing, 
Dutch Tweede Kamer 
Swedish Riksdag, UK 
House of Commons 
Legal Rule-Following 
In the first approach, subsidiarity is a (quasi-) legal rule, and the purpose of the EWM is to enable the 
EU to legislate in a manner that complies with it. The practical requirements of subsidiarity for EU 
legislation are definite: if they are not self-evident, they are at least determinable, in the sense that they 
may be discovered through a rational process – such as the Commission’s elaborate systems of 
consultation and impact assessment. Subsidiarity is also clearly separable from the related principles 
of conferral, proportionality, policy effectiveness and political expediency. As a result national 
parliaments can and should narrow the substantive focus of the EWM to subsidiarity only; if they wish 
to raise objections to an EU proposal based on these other principles, they must do so through the 
Political Dialogue, or address their concerns to their respective governments who act as the 
representatives of the member states in the Council. Because subsidiarity is a narrowly-defined 
principle, and the Commission has internal expertise in determining its requirements, in practice it will 
be a rare occurrence for there to be an EU legislative proposal that violates it. Therefore, the EWM 
should in practice be seldom used, activated only on those rare occasions where the Commission has 
made a manifest error in its reasoning with respect to subsidiarity. On those occasions, the national 
parliaments can use their reasoned opinions to helpfully point out the error to the Commission, acting 
much like a Council of State, using the EWM much like a legal ex ante check on the constitutionality 
of a legislative proposal. In doing so, each national parliament will in general focus on the legislative 
proposal and its dialogue with the Commission – which it will view more as a partner than an 
adversary – and disregard the opinions of other national parliaments.64 In this approach, national 
parliaments act solely in an individual capacity and do not form a collective. They are nothing but a 
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“phantom collective,” and if a yellow card occurs it will not be the result of interparliamentary 
coordination but merely “a coincidental sum of unrelated events.”65 
It seems clear that this is the approach to the EWM favoured by the Commission. The Commission 
has consistently favoured an EWM focused solely on subsidiarity, narrowly defined. To this end, the 
Commission has, within the EWM context, been dismissive of objections raised by national 
parliaments in their reasoned opinions that are not, in the Commission’s eyes, strictly subsidiarity-
related. Are there also some national parliamentary chambers that favour such an approach? For many 
chambers, it is difficult to say: whereas a great number of them only rarely pass a reasoned opinion to 
raise objections to an EU legislative proposal, such inactivity may simply reflect a lack of capacity to 
intervene rather than a sincere belief that all such proposals are subsidiarity-compliant. However, 
some parliamentary chambers have shown that they have the capacity to act but do not do so. One 
example is the Finnish Eduskunta, which is consistently ranked as among the “strongest” parliaments 
in the EU; however, the Eduskunta is primarily focused on controlling the Finnish government’s 
position on EU affairs, and it generally refrains from participating in the EWM and other forms of 
interparliamentary cooperation. Moreover, it adheres to a narrow interpretation of subsidiarity and 
rejects the use of the EWM as a means to voice political opposition to EU proposals.
66
 This means, in 
effect, that the Eduskunta supports the “legal rule-following” approach to the EWM. This could also 
be said of those chambers that most actively participate in the Political Dialogue, such as the 
Portuguese parliament
67
 and the Italian Senato,
68
 but rarely pass reasoned opinions under the EWM. 
These chambers obviously have the capacity to communicate their views to the Commission, but they 
choose to act informally through the Political Dialogue rather than through the EWM, thus implicitly 
recognizing the boundary between the principle of subsidiarity and other principles which may be 
construed as “related” under the EWM.  
Political Bargaining 
In the second approach, subsidiarity is an elastic concept with no fixed meaning. In practical terms, it 
can be employed to justify almost any position in favour of or in opposition to EU action in a given 
circumstance. This means that it is not possible to differentiate between subsidiarity and the related 
principles of conferral, proportionality, and policy effectiveness. Moreover, a reasoned opinion raising 
subsidiarity objections will be indistinguishable from one that is based on political expediency alone. 
In other words, national parliaments will simply adopt reasoned opinions in response to EU legislative 
proposals that they oppose for political reasons, using subsidiarity as a pretext. National parliaments 
will prefer to use the EWM rather than the Political Dialogue because it offers them greater leverage 
in the EU’s legislative process, and the division between the two channels of communication with the 
Commission relies on a meaningless distinction between subsidiarity and other concerns. National 
parliaments will tend to see the Commission as an adversary. Also, they will be intensely interested in 
what is going on in other parliamentary chambers, counting votes under the EWM. In the case of a 
proposal they find objectionable, they will seek to build a coalition of chambers in opposition, with the 
aim of gathering enough votes under the EWM to achieve a yellow card or an orange card. In such 
cases the national parliaments would most closely resemble a “virtual third chamber” in which they 
                                                     
65
 P Kiiver, The National Parliaments in the European Union: A Critical View on EU Constitution-Building, (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 2006) 162, 164. 
66
 T Raunio, ‘The Finnish Eduskunta and EU: The Strengths and Weaknesses of a Mandating System,’ in Hefftler et al. The 
Palgrave Handbook of National Parliaments and the European Union (n 3) 416. 
67
 D Jančić, ‘The Portuguese Parliament and EU Affairs: From Inert to Agile Democratic Control,’ in Hefftler et al. The 
Palgrave Handbook of National Parliaments and the European Union (n 3) 379-380. 
68
 S Cavatorto, ‘Italy: Still Looking for a New Era in the Making of EU Policy’ in Hefftler et al. The Palgrave Handbook of 
National Parliaments and the European Union (n 3) 222-223. See also the chapter by N Lupo, this volume. 
Is the Subsidiarity Early Warning Mechanism a Legal or a Political Procedure? Three Questions and a Typology 
21 
seek to maximize their legislative leverage on salient issues, making them a collective “veto-player” – 
or something close to it – in the EU’s legislative process.  
While no national parliamentary chambers perfectly exemplify this approach to the EWM, two that 
come close are the Danish Folketing and the Dutch Tweede Kamer. Both of these parliaments take an 
explicitly political approach to the EWM and both have at times acted strategically to rally other 
national parliaments to oppose a legislative measure with the specific goal of achieving a yellow 
card.
69
 While the Danish parliament is not one of the most active participants in the EWM – the 
number of reasoned opinions it passes is actually close to the average – the Folketing was the first 
chamber to pass one in opposition to the Monti II Regulation, and after that it deliberately set out to 
persuade other parliaments to do the same, raising the issue with them at an interparliamentary 
meeting that took place in Copenhagen during the eight-week review period.
70
 Similarly, the Tweede 
Kamer tried to persuade other national parliaments to oppose the proposal for the creation of the 
EPPO, raising the issue with them at an unrelated interparliamentary meeting that took place in 
Vilnius during the eight-week review period.
71
  
However, even some parliaments or chambers that only rarely participate in the EWM may also 
adopt this approach. Many may participate only selectively because they have decided that such a 
course of action is in their political interest. They may calculate that in most cases, even if they find a 
EU legislative proposal objectionable, it is not worth their time to pass a reasoned opinion because a 
yellow card is highly improbable. Yet on those rare occasions when the level of opposition reaches the 
point that a yellow card is within reach, they may judge it worthwhile to pass a reasoned opinion in the 
last stages of the process. An example of this kind of approach may be found in the actions of certain 
parliaments in the case of the Monti II yellow card. A detailed reconstruction of the timing and 
sequence of the various reasoned opinions in that case revealed an interesting pattern. Relatively early 
in the eight week review period, most of the parliaments/chambers that made a political decision to 
pass a reasoned opinion were those that had most frequently done so in the past. However, most of the 
reasoned opinions which came in the final week before the deadline – and which proved decisive in 
providing the necessary votes to reach the yellow card threshold – were passed by 
parliaments/chambers that had hitherto rarely or never passed a reasoned opinion under the EWM.
72
 
This “bandwagoning” occurred only at the point when it became apparent that the “vote count” was 
nearing the threshold for a yellow card, and that the participation of the additional 
parliaments/chambers would indeed make a difference. The pattern revealed in this episode accords 
with the more general finding that, on the whole, any given parliament or chamber is more likely to 
pass a reasoned opinion objecting to a proposal if many others have already done so,
73
 reflecting its 
increased incentive due to the prospect of a successful outcome, i.e. a yellow card. This dynamic 
shows that even among the majority of parliaments/chambers that have seldom passed reasoned 
opinions, there may be many adherents of the political bargaining approach. 
Policy Arguing 
The third approach occupies a middle ground between the other two regarding the norm of 
subsidiarity. In this approach subsidiarity is neither definite nor elastic, but rather ambiguous. As a 
concept it is vague but it is not meaningless, and it can prove useful in critically analysing a 
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prospective action of the EU. A similar point may be made concerning subsidiarity’s relationship to 
other, related, principles: it is neither neatly separable nor indistinguishable from them; rather, it 
remains a distinct concept, but it overlaps heavily with the related principles of conferral, 
proportionality and policy effectiveness. As a result, according to this approach (and unlike the legal 
rule-following approach) it is legitimate for a national parliament to raise, within the EWM itself, 
objections to an EU legislative proposal on the basis of these other concerns when they are closely 
related to subsidiarity concerns; such objections need not be relegated to the Political Dialogue. 
However (unlike the political bargaining approach), objections based purely on political expediency 
should be excluded from the EWM, although objections that are more broadly “political” will often be 
included. According to this approach, the role of national parliaments is to put forward arguments to 
fundamentally challenge the justifications put forward by the Commission (or other proposing body) 
that a given EU legislative proposal is indeed necessary and appropriate, and thereby subsidiarity 
compliant. The Commission is neither a partner nor an adversary, but rather an interlocutor in an 
argument over whether (subsidiarity) and how (proportionality) the EU should legislate in a given 
circumstance. National parliaments are not indifferent to one another’s positions, but they are less 
concerned with building a coalition of like-minded chambers to pass a yellow or orange card than with 
persuading their peers to add their voices of to the argument with the Commission over whether the 
proposed legislation is appropriate in a given circumstance. In order for the argument to be 
constructive, each side would need to listen to the other and be open to persuasion. Ideally, the 
involvement of national parliaments would result in the reshaping of legislative proposals in a way 
that improves public policy. If the EWM were to develop along these lines it would also resemble a 
“virtual third chamber,” but one in which the principal activity is policy deliberation rather than 
legislative bargaining.  
The Swedish Riksdag is the parliamentary chamber that best exemplifies this approach;
74
 the UK 
House of Commons is another possible example.
75
 The Riksdag has produced by far the greatest 
number of reasoned opinions among the national parliaments of the EU. This reflects, in part, 
peculiarities of its internal arrangements.
76
 In the Riksdag, responsibility for vetting EU legislative 
proposals and drafting reasoned opinions lies not with its European Affairs Committee but with fifteen 
sectoral committees, which means that the workload is shared out and their policy expertise is brought 
to bear; moreover, MPs examine every legislative proposal without preselection by parliamentary 
administrators. The Riksdag also feels free to raise objections within the EWM on other grounds than 
(narrowly-defined) subsidiarity, such as conferral, proportionality, or (as argued above in the case of 
Monti II) policy effectiveness. The Riksdag does not raise these other issues in the Political Dialogue, 
in part because, according to its own internal rules of procedure, any opinions pertaining to EU 
legislative files must be channelled through the EWM. But although it is very active in passing 
reasoned opinions under the EWM, the Riksdag is less inclined than some other parliaments – such as 
the Folketing or the Tweede Kamer – to reach out to other parliaments to try and build a coalition to 
achieve a yellow or orange card.
77
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VI. Conclusion: It Takes Two to Tango 
Even after it has been in operation for five years, the EWM remains an essentially contested 
procedure: the participants – mainly national parliaments and the Commission – do not agree over its 
nature and purpose. The EWM does not yet have a settled “social logic.” While the disagreement is 
often described as a debate between a legal and a political interpretation, it has been argued here that 
there are fundamentally three different approaches to the EWM, one legal (legal rule-following) and 
two political (political bargaining, policy arguing). Each of these approaches relies on its own 
understanding of the nature of subsidiarity and its relationship to associated principles, and of the 
relationship of national parliaments with the Commission and with one another. While these three 
potential social logics of the EWM are ideal types, certain participants may be identified as exemplars 
of each of the approaches. The Commission, in particular, exemplifies the legal rule-following 
approach, insofar as it insists that the EWM should be focused solely on the principle of subsidiarity, 
narrowly defined, and that any other concerns should be channelled through the Political Dialogue. 
And while the Commission has generally been procedurally responsive to the concerns of national 
parliaments – responding individually, in writing, to each opinion – it rarely or never concedes any 
substantive point regarding subsidiarity. This is illustrated by the Commission response to the two 
yellow cards under the EWM. In the first case, the Commission withdrew the Monti II Regulation, but 
it insisted that the reason was not the concerns of national parliaments about subsidiarity but rather the 
lack of political support in the Council and the EP.
78
 In the second case, the Commission maintained 
the EPPO proposal unchanged, dismissing as outside the scope of the EWM the concerns raised by 
national parliaments that were not based on a narrow definition of subsidiarity. In both cases the 
yellow card left the Commission seemingly unshaken in its conviction that its own interpretation of 
subsidiarity was essentially correct. 
The second approach, that of political bargaining, is exemplified by those parliaments – such as the 
Danish Folketing and the Dutch Tweede Kamer – which promote the use of the EWM as a political 
tool that national parliaments can use to enhance their influence in EU affairs. These chambers may 
even seek the achievement of a yellow card as an end in itself, independently of the substance of the 
proposal at hand, as a demonstration that the system works.
79
 Such a strategy may be read as a 
reasonable response to the Commission’s position: if a national parliament perceives that the 
Commission is unwilling to entertain any opposing arguments regarding subsidiarity, then it may 
decide that its most effective move is to pass a reasoned opinion under the EWM, which (unlike the 
Political Dialogue) legally obliges the Commission at least to respond to their concerns, if not to 
accede to them. 
In the third approach, national parliaments raise thoughtful objections to EU legislative proposals 
with the intention of instigating a constructive argument with the Commission over whether and how 
the EU should legislate. A decade ago this author thought, perhaps in an idealistic flight of fancy, that 
this would be the best possible outcome of the EWM: it would result in improved public policy and 
more subsidiarity-compliant EU legislation.
80
 Some parliamentary chambers, most notably the 
Swedish Riksdag, participate in the EWM in a way that suggests they seek such an argument with the 
Commission. However, such a constructive argument has not come about for the simple reason that 
the Commission has not been willing to engage in one. The problem, in short, is that it takes two to 
tango. 
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More recently, there has been some indication that the Commission may be willing to consider 
changing its approach towards national parliaments, subsidiarity and the EWM. The number of 
reasoned opinions from national parliaments grew steadily year-on-year between 2010-2013, but then 
fell sharply in 2014.
81
 This reflected in part a diminishment in the overall number of new legislative 
proposal in 2014, due to the EP elections and the anticipated installation of the new Commission. But 
it also reflected the fact that the new Commission promised increased respect for subsidiarity and far 
fewer new legislative proposals than what was previously the norm. If this continues, the reduced 
output of EU legislative proposals will likely mean that there will be fewer reasoned opinions from 
national parliaments. In addition, the new Commission included for the first time the position of a 
“First Vice-President” whose role, in part, is to act as a legislative gate-keeper, responsible for the 
application of subsidiarity. One month after taking office, this First Vice-President, Franz 
Timmermans – who is also responsible for inter-institutional relations, including relations with 
national parliaments – spoke at the COSAC meeting in Rome, saying the following: 
I think that the Commission should be more proactive in coming to national parliaments whenever 
there is an issue that is of importance related to Europe in national parliaments. If national 
parliaments take the trouble to scrutinize European proposals, and they then flag a yellow card, the 
Commission should respond. … And it should not respond along bureaucratic lines, it should 
respond in a political way. Because we all know that sometimes a yellow card is raised because 
there is a problem with subsidiarity or proportionality, and sometimes a yellow card is raised 
because there is more a problem with the content of a proposal. And then to dismiss that on 
procedural grounds I think is not the attitude the Commission should take. We should engage and 
explain in the national parliaments why we have decided to take a certain initiative. We should 
take on board the criticism formulated in national parliaments.
82
  
These remarks, which signal an openness to a more political approach to the EWM, were greeted 
warmly by the assembled national parliamentarians. At the time of writing, it is still early in the life of 
the new Commission, which has not yet been faced with a yellow card. As a result, it is too soon to tell 
whether this change in tone will result in an overall change in the social dynamics of the EWM.  
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